

CROWD VIOLENCE HANDLING: CASE STUDY OF MAGELANG CITY DISTRICT POLICE

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ABSTRACT

Crowd violence endangers human lives and has proximity to crime-related problems. This study discusses the crowd violence handling of the Magelang City district police. Participatory research, action research, and document analysis are applied to unearth the phenomena. The crowd violence in Magelang can be analysed using the two relevant theories: 1) psychological and 2) environmental criminology perspectives. Nevertheless, their application has not yet been detailedly explained in this study. Cooperation with relevant parties is needed to endeavour more law-abiding adolescents. Moreover, the crowd violence prevention strategies at the district police level shall be established and reviewed periodically to find better and more appropriate methods. Hence, crowd violence may be reduced and prevented for the advantage of broader society.

Keywords: crowd violence, crowd violence handling, Magelang City

ABSTRAK

Kekerasan massa membahayakan kehidupan manusia dan memiliki kedekatan dengan masalah terkait kejahatan. Penelitian ini membahas penanganan kekerasan massa di Polres Kota Magelang. Penelitian partisipatif, penelitian tindakan, dan analisis dokumen diterapkan untuk mengungkap fenomena tersebut. Dua jenis teori crowd violence di dalam literatur dapat menjelaskan fenomena dalam tiga studi kasus di Kota Magelang. Akan tetapi, penerapan teori-teori tersebut untuk kasus-kasus yang dibahas belum dapat dijelaskan secara detail di dalam paper ini. Kerja sama dengan pihak-pihak terkait sangat diperlukan untuk mengupayakan remaja yang lebih taat hukum. Selain itu, strategi pencegahan kekerasan massa di tingkat Polres perlu disusun dan ditinjau secara berkala untuk menemukan metode yang lebih baik dan tepat. Oleh karena itu, kekerasan massa dapat dikurangi dan dicegah untuk keuntungan masyarakat yang lebih luas.

Kata kunci: kekerasan massa, penanganan kekerasan massa, Kota Magelang

INTRODUCTION

Crowd violence is destructive behaviour that can threaten the lives of individuals, groups, communities, and nations and is more dangerous than a nuclear weapon (Taylor et al., 1988; Newburn, 2021, p. 65). Some public facilities and private ownerships may be devastated. Some injury or death victims might be caused by the crowds or police responses (Stott and Reicher, 1998a, pp. 354-355). Sometimes, police officers may also become the victims (Stott and Reicher, 1998b, p. 523; Tribunnews, 2021). Moreover, the perpetrators of the crowd-related crimes, usually the young, may be jailed for a lengthy period which implicates their future potential careers (Selamet, 2020; Al Ayyubi, 2020). The crowd is sometimes linked to other crimes (Madensen and Eck, 2011, p. 117). Therefore, crowd violence shall be addressed seriously to protect the interests of various parties: 1) government, 2) public, 3) private parties, and 4) members of the crowd.

The study of crowd violence prevention has been applied in some developed countries such as 1) the UK, 2) France, 3) Portuguese, 4) the Netherlands, 5) Sweden, and 6) the USA (Reicher, 2011; Stott, 2011; Stott et al. 2001; Adang, 2011; Hylander and Grandstorms, 2011; Waddington, 2011; Sousa and Mandensen, 2011; Holgersson and Knutsson, 2011). There are three types of crowd behaviour (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p. 1). They are 1) political demonstrations, 2) sporting events, and 3) festivities associated with alcohol consumption. Each type of crowd behaviour has different approaches applied to control potential violence. Moreover, two theoretical paradigms explain crowd violence (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p.2). The first is from the psychological perspective on crowd behaviour. Moreover, the second group is from the environmental criminology theory. The psychological view consists of the old crowd psychology and the new crowd psychology viewpoints (Reicher, 2011, p.13). The old crowd psychology

paradigm has been used as the primary application of policing crowd violence and being put in the police manuals. This perspective sees persons entering crowds are transformed their awareness into the group's one. They will act indiscriminately as the part of the crowd that can be trapped to insanity, act violently, and become criminals that can be considered suspects of the crimes by the police (Stott, 2011, p. 26). On the other side, the new crowd psychology treats the crowd differently. There are some different groups in the crowd. Some groups are criminals. However, some others comply with persons who incidentally or intentionally get in the crowd but have no intent to commit crimes (Reicher, 2011, p. 17). Hence the new psychological approach through four principles shall be applied (Reicher, 2011, pp.18-21): 1) understanding the social identities of the crowd, 2) differentiating the various psychological groups in a crowded event, 3) facilitating the legitimate aims of crowd members, and 4) communicating facilitating strategy to the crowd.

Afterwards, environment criminology applied 1) situational crime prevention (SCP) and 2) problem-oriented policing (POP) theories to address crowd violence (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p.2). Environmental criminology suggested risk assessment and planned response to crowd events (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p. 5). Moreover, POP stressed the importance of planning and analysis to the pre-event of the crowd before applying some interventions. After, it manages the evaluation of the effectiveness of the interventions. Also, SCP tried to analyse all potential opportunities and facilitating conditions that may cause violence from crowds. Crowds are considered the rewarding factor or enabling circumstances of the crime commissions (Madensen and Eck, 2011, pp. 116-117). Not just impacting violence, many crimes are easier to be committed in crowds: 1) pickpocketing, 2) throwing stones at the police, 3) breaking windows, 4) entering restricted premises, and 5) others.

The theory of crowd violence prevention suggests four recommendations to be exerted (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p. 6). First, the police shall understand the crowd's goals before implementing some efforts to handle them. Second, some available theories and evaluations of crowd prevention approaches shall be referred to develop crowd management strategies. Third, police behaviour shall be taken into account in developing the plan. Lastly, the police shall sincerely understand that the goal of crowd prevention is to protect the safety and rights of the participants. The efforts to prevent the crowd shall reduce the potential anxiety and tension that may exist during the crowd that may cause violence. For example, some provocateurs can be arrested to protect the positive intention of the other crowd members.

However, the crowd violence study (as part of crime science) in developing worlds is lacking (Natarajan, 2016). Thus, this research report shall try to fill that gap, studying crowd violence in Indonesia as one of the developing countries. This investigation applied participatory research, action research, and document analysis to reveal the phenomena of crowd violence in Indonesia with cases taken from March to December 2020 in Magelang City: 1) a football match between the Semarang Indonesia Football United (*Persatuan Sepak Bola Indonesia Semarang* [PSIS]) and the AREMA Football Club (AREMA) the date 14 March 2020 at the Moch Soebroto Stadion Magelang City, 2) the omnibus law demonstration on 9 October 2020 at the corner of the city of Magelang (near Artos Mall) and 3) the anniversary of the East Gate 1 as the supporters of the Magelang Football Association Union (*Persatuan Paguyuban Sepakbola Magelang* [PPSM]) date of 26 September 2020.

This study shall try to know whether crowd violence theories applied in the developed world are also implemented in the studied cases in Magelang City, Indonesia. Some recommendations may be given to developing better future approaches to handling crowd violence in Indonesia. However, this study is too limited in exploring complicated cases of crowd violence. Hence, future rigorous research is suggested to be more understanding of how crowd violence and its preventative actions are applied in Magelang.

METHOD

Research is conducted toward the Magelang City Police Force period of March 2020 to December 2020 as the unit analysis of the case study (Setyawan, 2021). The research subjects are 1) the officers of the district office (sworn officers, civil servants, and informal office workers) and 2) the public interacting with the policing processes.

The researcher applied participatory research, action research, and document analysis (Setyawan, 2021). Firstly, the participatory technique is applied (Bachman and Schutt, 2018;

Bryman, 2012; Setyawan, 2021), whereas the researcher is also the organisation's member. He is part of the research subjects. However, he is also the researcher of this study.

The second method is action research (Lewin, 1946; Lewin, 1947a; Holgersson, 2015). The investigator is the part of the research object, making decisions and actions within the object study and the other subjects of the research. This action research method is helpful in the limiting possibility of gaining knowledge (Lewin, 1947b; Braga and Kennedy, 2012). Time will be lost, but the data must be acquired even though rapidly processed and has many drawbacks (Cornish and Clarke, 2002; Bullock et al., 2010). Thus, all possible phenomena will be gained for further analysis to make urgent policy. Especially, practitioners shall not wait until the entire frame of knowledge is built to take the decision. Therefore, based on rough research, the policymakers and practitioners will focus on the potential factors and methods used for further actions.

The last method is document analysis (Bowen, 2009). Some documents are examined to support the findings gained from the other methods. The types of documents being reviewed are 1) the term of reference of the Magelang City chief of district police 2020, 2) the report of Magelang City chief district police 2020, 3) the daily reports of the Magelang City chief of district police, 4) online sources, and 5) others.

The methods applied have benefits and limitations. The researcher's position as an inside insider (Brown, 1996) is a crucial positive factor of the study. He embraced the observed variables directly, which may be likened to a video camera that records many aspects of the objects. He feels the process and value of the organisation, along with the other subjects of the study. However, he may be contracted on doing the job or being a researcher. The time for portraying all phenomena was hardly executed. Some variables in the organisation may be overlooked due to constraints. Besides, the potentiality of bewildering to distinguish between actual variables and the researcher's perceptions may disadvantage this investigation. The researcher's subjectivity may impact the reality and quality of this research.

RESULTS

a. Research Place Background

The place of research is in the Magelang City Police District Central Java (Setyawan, 2020a). The zone of the office consists of Magelang City and Bandongan Sub District. However, Bandongan is an administrative region under the leadership of the Magelang District Government, not the Magelang City administration. However, for policing administration, it is under the Magelang City Police. Magelang city's administration area consists of three sub-districts: 1) North Magelang, 2) Central Magelang, and 3) South Magelang. The policing area is 18,5364 kilometres square of Magelang City and 46,47 kilometres square for the Bandongan District (Badan Pusat Statistik [BPS] Kota Magelang, 2019; BPS Kabupaten Magelang, 2019). The people living in the region are 121.872 citizens from Magelang City and 60.481 from the Bandongan subdistrict.

Magelang City Police is part of the Central Java Regional Police (Setyawan, 2020a; Setyawan, 2020b). Also, Magelang City police are part of the ex-Kedu sub-regional police area. The zone covered five police districts: 1) Temanggung, 2) Magelang, 3) Wonosobo, 4) Kebumen, and 5) Magelang City. The ex-sub-regional police area concept is applied because it was thought that the local district police could not execute local policing alone, especially when the office faces an emergency problem. For example, an escalated social conflict sometimes needs the support of more deployment of police officers, especially in handling riots or crowd violence. The regional police headquarters may not assist the local district police adequately and swiftly when a sudden conflict escalation happens. Hence, the districts shall collaborate to tackle conflict in their respective areas.

Policing work is conducted by the Magelang City Police with some other local authorities (Setyawan, 2020b). The Magelang City and Magelang District Governments are authorised to maintain order through their respective departments: 1) the department of civil service police (Dinas Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja [Satpol PP]) and 2) the Politics and Nations Integrity Agency (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik [Kesbangol]). Satpol PP maintains public order through the enforcement of local government regulations. Kesbangpol coordinates relevant parties to assure that social conflict is prevented. Social conflict (Oberschall, 1978) is

any dispute between parties triggered by factors, such as religion, politics, economic, and social matters. For example, a political dispute may implicate crimes, such as defamation or molestation. The police detective will investigate the crimes. Nevertheless, under the coordination of Kesbangpol, the authorised parties cooperate in anticipating the dispute implicating other problems, such as a massive social conflict.

The second party is military commanders (Setyawan, 2020b). The Magelang Military District Command commander does territorial mandates similar to policing activity which may be called military policing (Easton, 2017). The military operation area includes both Magelang City and Magelang District administration areas. Additionally, there are some other military commanders in Magelang. They are 1) the chief of the Military Academy (Gubernur Akademi Militer [Gubernur Akmil]), 2) some commanders of battalions (Komandan Batalion [Danyon]), 3) the commander of the RINDAM (Danrindam), 4) the chief of the Military Hospital (Kepala Rumah Sakit Tentara [Karumkit RST]), and 5) the Military Police commander (Komandan Polisi Militer [Danpom]). Magelang can be considered a military city because of the abundance of army units in the area. This condition may implicate a unique policing approach to the area, which can be studied further.

The third group is the criminal justice process parties (Setyawan, 2020b). They are 1) the district attorney general office, 2) the district court office, 3) the district state prison/penitentiary, and 4) the district probation service is mandated to prosecute all crimes. These agencies cooperate in managing the criminal process, crime prevention, and ex-convicts living in the district area. The police have declared a crime reduction strategy as part of its policing target. However, this office has not applied the systematic crime reduction strategy (Bullock and Tilley, 2011) discussed in the literature.

b. Football match between the PSIS and the AREMA

There are two parties in this crowd violence incident. The first side is the PSIS supporters, and the second one is the AREMA followers (Kepolisian Resor Magelang Kota [Polres Magelang Kota], 2020a). There are about 16.000 audiences in the match from both parties. Most of the supporters were compliance ones. The crowd was triggered by provocateurs (Hylander and Granstrom, 2011, p.80) within both groups.

The process of the conflict can be identified as follows. Firstly, supporters were transported to the match venue in Magelang from multiple directions in small groups from both parties (the PSIS and Arema Malang). Some potential trouble supporters were identified. The supporters were suspected of bringing alcoholic beverages, stones, or knives that may provoke violence and cause fatal damage. Hence, stops and searches were conducted on both parties. However, the officers' number was limited so that unidentified potential provocateurs could not be stopped to enter the venue.

For example, drunk supporters (of the Arema) were identified throwing stones at the bench of the opponent's party (the PSIS) that might provoke potential revenge. Nevertheless, the crowd protected them from being apprehended by the police by making a "black bloc" (Hylander and Granstrom, 2011, p. 69). Enforcement may instigate an early clash between the police and the crowd. Hence the enforcement of the potential accused was deferred. The police focused on anticipating the overall potential conflict rather than arresting specific persons protected by the masses. This decision was made because of the limited number of officers handling the crowd.

Afterwards, before the match was over, some provocations caused conflict between both parties. There was an incident of plastic bottles and cups thrown at each other from the two adjacent supporters' benches. Later, PSIS supporters from the north bench run through the soccer field and attack the AREMA supporters (Prabowo and Annagga, 2020). However, further conflicts could be prevented through the tear gas shooting by the police.

After finishing the match, PSIS supporters were asked to leave the venue first before the AREMA's turn. Some hours were allocated to ensure the PSIS supporters had left the stadium and disunited. After, AREMA supporters were escorted by the officers to their vehicles at the protected area. Moreover, they were prevented from leaving the secured zone before the PSIS supporters were assumed to clear off the streets. The PSIS's supporters' movement process was communicated in the police radio system. The AREMA followers waited at the safe place until about midnight.

Nevertheless, despite the protection effort by the police, attacks by the PSIS supporters on the buses of the AREMA still occurred in Bawen near Semarang city during their transport back to Malang at night (Pradana, 2020). Bawen is about 61 kilometres from Magelang (DistanceBetween2.com, [no year]). However, the AREMA was successfully escorted to leave the conflicting zone by the police despite some of their busses' glasses being broken caused by stones thrown by the PSIS group.

There were some problems in the process of preventing crowd violence. First, the quantities of officers were small compared to the crowd (700 to 16.000). Hence, various possible actions could not be managed to prevent the escalation of the masses. For example, the provocateurs could have been identified and arrested to cool down the situation if adequate officers, resources, and a systematic strategy were allocated. Secondly, the officers were not trained and well-coordinated to handle complex crowd violence. Thirdly, there was no assessment report of the previous crowd handling for a similar event. The same conflict among the supporters had happened previously in the same place in 2019. If it were available, a similar difficulty would have been detected for being handled better in the 2020' football match.

From the case, crowd violence in a football match is learnt. First, there were some fragmented groups from both supporters. Most of the spectators were not violent perpetrators. The most crucial party that caused the conflict was the provocative drunk participants. They had been socialised in their respective groups to be different from their opponents and think of their rival's group as enemies. Afterwards, the entering the venue proceeding from both parties was potentially causing an early clash. The potential conflict was caused by provocative music played by both supporters during their entrance proceeding to the stadium. Next, both sides played yells and music that irritated the opposite contenders during the match. Also, some instigators promoted conflict by throwing stones, bottles, or cups at the opposing sides. Lastly, after finishing the match, leaving the stadium and travelling back to supporters' residences may occur quarrels on the street affected by the previous incidents.

c. Omnibus law demonstration on the date of 9 October 2020 at the corner of the city of Magelang (near the Artos Mall)

On 9 October 2020 there was a demonstration initiated by Gerakan Rakyat Magelang Raya (GERAM) (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020b). The issue raised was the protest to the President and the Parliament of enacting the Law of Cipta Kerja (the Omnibus Law). The demonstration was planned to be centred in the Alun-Alun of Magelang City, but the city police chief refused (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020b). The refusal was based on the Covid 19 pandemic situation and the rejection by the townspeople. Also, the reason was a prediction that there would be riot as in the other cities: 1) Jakarta (CNN Indonesia, 2020), 2) Bandung (Nugraha, 2020), 3) Yogyakarta (VOA, 2020) 4) Malang (Kompas, 2020), 5) Surabaya (Utomo, 2020), and Medan (Molana, 2020). Therefore, the protest event was held outside the city but on the border area between Magelang District and Magelang City. Nevertheless, in the zone, there are some susceptible objects. The streets are the hub for logistics distribution between Jogja and Central Java provinces through Magelang. After, there is the biggest Supermarket in the area, Armada Town Square (ARTOS). Next, some public offices of the Magelang City Council are also near the spot for the demonstration.

Most of the crowd followers were youngsters and students (Susanto, 2020b) as the thrilled seekers (Hylander and Granstrom, 2011, p.81). Content on social media provoked the students to attend the event (Setyawan, 2020b). They thought that the government were unfair and corrupt. They decided to follow the protest as their expression of disappointment. Junior and Senior High School Students also tried to engage in the other protest event of Omnibus Law Demonstration with the Tag of Magelang Bergerak, on 13 October 2020 (Fitriana, 2020; Mulyono, 2020b). Based on the previous year's demonstration, a similar type of Junior and Senior High School students was also involved and caused some damage to the city office (Susanto, 2019). The involvement of the junior and senior high school students in the protest was detected in the other cities in the same year and previous year, such as 1) Jakarta (Tribunnews, 2019; Putri, 2019; Ernes, 2020), and 2) Purworejo (Heksantoro, 2019). Social media is a valuable platform to invite young students to attend the crowds (Baker, 2011; Baker, 2012).

There were three waves in the process of the demonstration on that day. The first group was some organised teenagers using motorcycles arriving from the east part of the venue. The members were parking their motorcycles sitting around the demonstration venue. The demonstration's organisers were making some speeches at the rally. Next, the participants were given foods to be consumed on the scene. Later, they left the place to the way they were coming.

Afterwards, the second group arrived from the south part of the venue. They were prevented from joining the first group. The police, military and local government officers asked them to go home. However, this group rejected the request. Moreover, some of them shouted, "we want to fight the police before going home". This fact confirmed Adang's (2011, p.57) finding that some crowds violence participants target the police. Also, it was rumoured that the students had all cops, all bastards (ACAB) (Havelund et al., 2016) perspective in the rally process as marked previously as symbols at some places in Indonesia (Jauhola and Bolong, 2017, p. 226). They marched together, approaching the police officers, throwing stones, kicking and hitting them (Susanto, 2020a). They were singing the football supporters' yells during the attack, proceeding to the police. Hence it was assumed that they were football-related youngsters. Next, officers shot tear gasses at the crowd and dispersed them. Some group members were arrested and brought to the police's office. Nevertheless, some disbanded participants violently destroyed public facilities (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020b). These included 1) the Wiworo Wiji Pinilih Building's glasses and lamps, 2) public vases, 3) traffic lamps, 4) the local house of the representative front building, 5) the vehicle of the City Satpol PP, and 6) lamps of the city park.

Subsequently, the third group was coming from the west of the venue. It was about hundreds of teenagers. The conflict happened between the participants and the officers in front of Jenderal Sudirman street. If the officers approached the crowd, the mob ran, attacked the officers with stones, and mocked them. The police brought heavy shields and batons and had difficulty moving swiftly to draw closer to the group. Some of the officers were looked emotional cause of the provocation of the protesters. The chief was calming them down and giving them drinking water. After, the officers conducted flanking strategy by shifting their position to the backwards of the crowd. Through this strategy, the crowd were successfully broken up of not being united again. Some of the participants were also arrested.

The military authority and the police had cooperated to avoid the clash through some efforts. Firstly, it was comprehended that some similar parties organised the demonstration movements. The police and military approached the interested parties to discuss their idea of making demonstrations. The most crucial issue is not preventing them from not doing demonstrations but making the events rendered peacefully. Moreover, because of the covid 19 pandemic, there has been a discussion about the possibility of deferring the rally. This step was necessary for the public's interest, preventing the spread of the virus. The second mitigation was by cleaning stones found by the police in the morning before the event. The rocks were suspected of being prepared and put one night before by an unidentified party for fighting with the police.

Afterwards, the police prevented the crowd violence through early stop and search and preventive arrests of some participants (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020b). The police are authorised to conduct this measure in the public's interest (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tentang Hukum Acara Pidana [HAP] 1981). Similar youngsters had made destructions in the other rallies in other cities that predicted would happen in Magelang that day. The preventive arrest produced benefits. It was evident that the participants secured before the clash was physically fitter than those arrested after the conflict. The latter were majority injured, some of their belongings were lost or broken. For example, a participant lost his motorcycle during the unrest. This better condition of the early saved participants could be claimed as the success of preventive arrests by the police. The students were saved from being victims of the predicted crowd violence and other related crimes.

The next step was databasing the students, counselling, and inviting their parents to bring them home. The students were invited for counselling and discussion to understand their motives and risk of joining the unrest. Besides, they directly saw the difference between the two groups arrested before and after the clash. The first group of students and their parents were thankful to the police and the soldiers for preventing the children from joining the rally.

Hence, they were saved from injury and other crimes (i.e., losing their belongings). The latter boys and their parents were aware of and accepted the consequences of following the violent unrest and admitting their fallibility. Later, the students were not detained and handed over to their parents.

Lastly, socialisation through the media was rendered. After the commotion, the media asked about the police chief's situation perspective. In the interviewing process, the leader explained the social media incitement that brought the students to the unrest, the similar massive cases in other regions for the same issue, and the loss caused by the incident and asked the public support to prevent future akin problems.

Additionally, two other political rallies were available for explaining the existence of crowd violence in Magelang. They were 1) the declaration of the National Coalition of Actions for Saving Indonesia (Koalisi Aksi Menyelamatkan Indonesia [KAMI]) on 18 September 2020 and (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020c) 2) another protest event to Omnibus Law on 13 October 2020 with the tag of #Magelang Bergerak 2 (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020d). Similar processes of crowd violence were identified in both cases. However, they are not discussed further due to this paper's limitations.

d. The anniversary of the East Gate 1 as the supporters of the Magelang Football Association Union (Persatuan Paguyuban Sepakbola Magelang [PPSM])

On 26 September 2020, there was the anniversary of the East Gate 1 (a group of supporters of the Magelang Football Club) at the Ballroom of Hotel Borobudur Indah Ahmad Yani Street Magelang City (Polres Magelang Kota, 2020d). The police disbanded the event because the crowd breached the Covid 19 prevention regulation standard by the chief of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the City Council's permission. The number of visitors should be only 50 persons, but the attendants were about 200 people, which is over the capacity of a safe room. Moreover, some of the members were drunk and may endanger the public. Hence the police and the Satpol PP of the City Council disbanded the event. The Crowd fight the police by throwing stones and bottles. Afterwards, the event organisers and some participants were arrested for interrogation.

DISCUSSION

The three types of crowd violence discussed in the literature (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p.1) are available in Magelang City: 1) football matches, 2) political movements, and 3) party related crowds. First, from crowd violence in the football match, it can be learnt that there are fragmented groups from both groups (of supporters). Moreover, most of the spectators were not violent. The conflict was instigated by 1) the provocative drunk participants and 2) intended provocateurs from both parties. They (the provocateurs) had been socialised in their respective groups to be different from their opponents and think of their rival's group as enemies. This view has applied the new crowd psychology perspective (Reicher, 2011) to see that the crowds may consist of 1) criminals and 2) non-criminals. Afterwards, the environmental criminological view (i.e., POP and SCP) was also applied (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011). There are some stages identified in the proceeding of the supporters of the football crowd 1) entering the venue, 2) the match, 3) exiting the venue and 4) proceeding to homes. All the stages have the potential for violent crimes. For example, the potential conflict may be implicated by 1) provocative music played by both supporters, 2) mocking 3) throwing of goods (i.e., stones, bottles, or cups). Lastly, after finishing the match, leaving the stadium and travelling back to supporters' residences may occur, and quarrels on the street may be affected by the previous incidents (in the entering and the match proceeding). However, the application of 1) systematic risk assessment and planned responses and 2) evaluation by the police have not been unveiled in the reviewed case.

Similarly, the Omnibus Law demonstration's attendees can be categorised as 1) criminals and 2) non-criminals. It is identified that there was a planned attack on the police from the prepared stones found in the crowd scene early morning before the event. The second and third waves of the groups can be considered criminals of their conduct of attacking the police. This condition confirms that the new perspective of crowd psychology (Reicher, 2011) applied in the Magelang context.

Tactical proceedings conducted by the authorities (the police, military, and government) apply POP / SCP of the environmental criminological approach to crowd violence (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011). Some significant responses are used to prevent the violent risks of the crowd: 1) socialising, 2) searching, 3) stopping and arresting, 3) enforcing, 4) consolidating, and 5) media communication. However, the details of applying POP/ SCP (similar to the previous studies) to the event are not entirely revealed in this research report. Also, the last case (the Gate 1 annual ceremony) handling was not detailedly explored of 1) the analysis of the groups of the crowd (criminals and non-criminals) and 2) the using POP/ SCP to address the problem.

Subsequently, the strategy to analyse the psychological aspects and opportunities of the crowds has unsuccessfully revealed by this research (i.e., new psychology theory, SCP, POP) being applied in handling the crowd violence in Magelang City.

Because of the importance of crowd violence handling for society, this study suggests several recommendations. First, the police shall approach schools and parents (Sherman et al., 1998, p.1) of the vulnerable students. This intervention may influence the students to be more aware of the importance of focusing on study than involving insignificant activities that may implicate their safety and future. This suggestion is essential for preventing future potential damaging demonstrations involving the students (the second case). Despite not being explained, some students may also be involved in the football match and festivity types of crowd violence. Hence, this recommendation may be applied to the two other types of crowd events. However, the students may not be sourced from the local residences of the crowd events. For example, in the Magelang case (the political demonstration), the students that attended the demonstration were from the neighbourhood districts: 1) Temanggung, 2) Magelang, 3) Wonosobo, or 4) Kebumen, rather than from Magelang City. Besides, the supporters came from distant cities for the football match crowd. In the case of the PSIS and AREMA's match in March 2020, some of the members possibly were from Malang, Semarang, or other distant urban areas. Hence, approaching the students shall be implemented by all police districts in their respective authorised regions to reduce the broader risk of future crowd violence.

The second recommendation is to apply a systematic strategy of crowd violence prevention in the police districts (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011). The officers are the significant party that may cause the conflict with the protesters (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011, p.6), especially if they could not handle their tactics in dealing with a crowd because of the lack of analysis. Hence, some approaches to make the officers understand the strategies in handling crowd violence shall be carried out. The police chief shall create a strategic platform for handling demonstrations at the district level and discuss them periodically (Sousa and Madensen, 2011; Plant and Scott, 2011; Holgersson and Knutsson, 2011). There will be frameworks that can be learnt from some crowd violence cases. The office shall prioritise what shall be conducted with the office's limited resources. Later, targeting and planning actions to prevent future crowd violence may be carried out. Further, the documentation, evaluation, and reporting processes can be executed to enrich the office's database crowd prevention strategies.

Thirdly, the theories and evaluations made by scholars in the area of crowd violence prevention shall be learnt of their potentiality for implementation at the local level by the education department of the police (Madensen and Knutsson, 2011). The role of the education function of the police is essential. The theories shall be learnt in the cadets' class for specific police function discussions: 1) criminal investigation, 2) community policing, 3) uniformed police function (Sabhara), 4) traffic police, 5) intelligence, and 6) others. Further, the *pengasuhan* is suggested to apply a more evidence-based view in policing (Sherman, 1998). *Pengasuhan* can be considered transferring basic policing training to the officers (Green, 2018, p.35). The practices and theories of the application on handling crowd violence, for example, shall be trained in *pengasuhan* proceedings. *Pengasuhan* shall be the daily enculturation of the actual police functions. Moreover, this approach shall be applied in all other education functions of the police.

Fourthly, the research on policing shall be enhanced in the future that involve internal and external parties of the police organisation (Brown, 1996). The new policing must include parties interested in policing reform agenda (Newburn, 2008; Mawby, 2008). The stressing of research as part of policing had been explicitly declared by the Indonesian National Police (INP) chief in the application of predictive policing (Prabowo, 2021, p. 19). The INP has stated its intention to make the police more research-based, comprising any party in enhancing policing works as in other developed countries (Weisburd and Neyroud, 2011). Additionally, policing is applied science

(Nagel and Vera, 2020), not pure science. It studies the process of policing and the police institution scientifically but does not muddle through only to discuss the conceptions of the police.

Furthermore, any science major may contribute to policing, not just exclusively owned by the bachelor, master, or doctor in policing or people working in the public police (Holdaway, 2020). As scholars embrace policing as the research object, they shall be appreciated as police scientists. This practice has been a long time implemented in developed countries. Many academics joined policing improvement from a design perspective (Ekblom, 2001), computer science (Holgersson, 2015), psychology (Clarke, 1980), economics (Farrell, 1995) and others to help the policing work. The Week for Sport for Students and Cadets (Pekan Olah Raga Mahasiswa Pelajar dan Taruna [Porsimaptar]) has marked the not dissimilar intention through the invitation to various parties to join in the discussion on policing in Indonesia (Indonesian National Police Academy, 2021). Thus, it shall be appreciated and embraced by any individuals or organisations curious to help to solve social problems through policing (Goldstein, 1979; Goldstein, 1990). The study of crowd violence in this research is only an example that might be investigated better and rigorously in the future, using theories from various scientific disciplines. Many lives, public properties, and people's interests can be saved through future investigations in policing.

CONCLUSION

This paper has explained the study of crowd violence prevention in Indonesia. Three cases were discussed: 1) football match between PSIS and AREMA, 2) omnibus law demonstration, and 3) the anniversary of the East Gate 1. The research found that the Magelang crowd violence 1) can be explained by the crowd violence perspectives but 2) but the POP/SCP approaches have not yet been fully implemented. Subsequently, the police are recommended to approach the students to prevent future crowd violence. Next, the police districts shall develop crowd violence prevention strategies in their respective offices. After, the police shall not exclusively exert crowd violence prevention and other aspects of policing research agenda. Various competent parties shall be included in the endeavour. Scholars from many disciplines can be involved in problem-solving (Eck and Spelman, 1987) to crowd violence and other policing problems for the advantage of society.

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